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PREFACE
Much has happened in the 16 years since this author penned a monograph entitled Redefining Land
Power for the 21st Century. The United States suffered
the tragedies of September 11, 2001, the first attack of
a wave of large-scale extremist terrorist activities that
have scourged the globe from London to Bali to Madrid to Mumbai to Nairobi and beyond. The invasion
and subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq
and the ebbing war in Afghanistan have significantly
engaged U.S. military power, especially Landpower,
for over a decade. The ongoing volatility of the international security environment continues to generate
crises that may embroil U.S. national interests: an
increasingly erratic North Korea that may be on the
verge of implosion, confrontation with Iran over its
nuclear policies, the turbulence of the Arab Spring
and its consequences, growing unrest in broad swaths
of Africa, and multiple crises in the Middle East, to
name but a few. Moreover, the dramatic rise of China
as a global economic and regional military power and
a resurgent and revanchist Russia could lead to renewed great power competition.
The character of warfare has undergone significant
change, as well. Accelerating technological innovation,
whether in new weapons or dramatically increased
precision of older weapons, continues to revolutionize
warfare. At the same time, the return of older forms
of warfare, such as guerilla warfare and insurgencies,
further complicate the conduct of modern war. The
rise of nonstate actors with weapons that can exceed
the capabilities of many states has emerged as a new
factor. All of this in combination has led, supposedly,
to new forms of warfare, such as hybrid warfare or 4th
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Generation Warfare, that have increased the complexity of modern warfare. Lastly, the rise of cyber-based
capabilities has yet to reveal the full extent of what
may be an entirely new battlefield. All told, the character of warfare has changed remarkably, and will undoubtedly continue to do so.
Yet, numerous continuities remain. By the late1990s, the American public already had grown tired
of prolonged peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Africa and the Balkans.1 Trying to bring
democracy to the Middle East and Southwest Asia
over the course of the last decade-plus has proven too
expensive in terms of lives and treasure lost relative to
perceived gains. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the
end of 2011 and the denouement of the war in Afghanistan have left a war weary U.S. public. Moreover, just
as after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, prolonged
counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq—with a
heavy commitment of ground forces—has dulled any
American appetite for further participation in counterinsurgency operations.2
Like the 1990s, rising fiscal pressures have accompanied this general disillusionment with U.S. global
engagement. Political and military leaders have expressed concern that the number one priority for
the United States is getting its fiscal house in order.3
At the same time, the United States is in the midst
of executing a geo-strategic “rebalance” to the AsiaPacific region, an expensive undertaking. Budget constraints, particularly the rise of mandatory spending
cuts, place increasing pressure on the Department of
Defense budget.
These combined disenchantments have translated
into a public leery of further interventions. While analysts and policymakers cannot know with certainty
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whether the U.S. public and political leadership will
countenance any more “long wars,” recent experience
in Libya, strong opposition to U.S. involvement in the
civil war in Syria, public apathy over the Russian seizure of parts of Ukraine, and indifference to renewed
fighting in Iraq offer hints that future intervention
may be difficult to undertake.
Because of the confluence of all of these issues,
some national leaders, defense intellectuals, and analysts have questioned once more the continuing relevance of land forces and Landpower. Thus, in an incredibly ironic paradox, after 13 years of wars fought
largely within the human dimension predominantly
by ground forces that have borne the brunt of combat and casualties, proponents of Landpower feel
compelled to explain Landpower and justify the retention of Landpower capabilities in the face of significant budget (and, therefore force structure and
personnel) cuts.
The combination of these circumstances call for
a new examination of the roles of Landpower in the
21st century.
ENDNOTES - PREFACE
1. For examples of public opinion following Somalia, see
Carolyn J. Logan, “U.S. Public Opinion and the Intervention in
Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Interventions,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 20, No.
2, Summer/Fall 1996, available from dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/
tufts:UP149.001.00040.00013, accessed June 16, 2014. For public
views on the Balkans, see, for instance, Lydia Saad, “Americans
Hesitant, as Usual, About U.S. Military Action in Balkans,” Gallup News Service, March 24, 1999, available from www.gallup.com/
poll/3994/americans-hesitant-usual-about-us-military-action-balkans.
aspx, accessed June 16, 2014.
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2. See, e.g., Nathan Freier, “How the Iraq War Crippled U.S.
Military Power,” Defense One, May 1, 2014, available from www.
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Nathan Freier et al., point out, war costs, national debt, and a belief that large-scale wars are no longer likely exacerbates this war
weariness. See Nathan Freier et al., U.S. Ground Capabilities through
2020, A Report of the CSIS New Defenses Project, Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2011,
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Walt, “No Hawks Here,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2014, available
from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/17/no_hawks_here_realists_international_relations_war_peace, accessed April 17, 2014.
It is important to note, that even in the wake of Vietnam, the
United States helped engage in counterinsurgency operations in
Latin America.
3. See, as examples, National Security Strategy of the United
States, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 2; Tyrone
C. Marshall, “Debt is Biggest Threat to Security, Chairman Says,”
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SUMMARY
After 13 years of prolonged ground combat, a weary American public is leery of further interventions requiring land forces. Shifting geo-strategic conditions,
such as a revanchist Russia and a rising China, reinforce this reluctance. At the same time, technological
innovation once more offers the chimera of war from
a distance that does not endanger land forces.
Nonetheless, at some point, a highly volatile international security environment will place U.S. national
interests at risk, requiring the use of military power.
Given the increasing rise of interdependence among
all components of military power (air, cyberspace,
land, sea, and space), a better understanding of Landpower is essential if national leaders are to have a full
range of policy options for protecting and promoting
those interests.
Landpower, “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, exploit control over land,
resources, and people,” stems from a country’s geostrategic conditions, economic power, population,
form of government, and national will. The military
elements of Landpower include a country’s ground
forces, the institutions that generate and sustain those
forces, and the human dimension—intelligent, highly
adaptable, and innovative individuals—so vital to the
successful employment of Landpower.
Landpower offers policymakers tremendous utility in peace, crisis, or war, as it can defeat, deter, compel, reassure, engage, and support the nation. Within
each of these roles, as well as across them, Landpower
can carry out the broadest range of military operations. This versatility across the spectrum of conflict
offers national leaders the greatest number of effective
policy options.
xi

RE-EXAMINING THE ROLES OF LANDPOWER
IN THE 21st CENTURY AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS
… every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting
conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each
period, therefore, would have held its own theory of
war…
		

Carl von Clausewitz, On War1

Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, exploit control over land, resources, and people.
		

Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army2

INTRODUCTION
While some readers may be surprised to learn that
an official definition of the term Landpower is a recent phenomenon, this circumstance may not be as
odd as outside observers might think.3 For many military practitioners, especially Soldiers and Marines,
the concept of Landpower is so deeply ingrained that
it is largely self-evident. It has existed since our first
ancestors used their fists, rocks, and sticks to defend
themselves from attacks by predatory neighbors. As a
result, a several millennial-long understanding of land
warfare exists. Indeed, key strategists and theorists,
such as Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and
Antoine-Henri Jomini, would not have thought of war
as anything other than the application of Landpower.
At the same time, a less than clear understanding of
the elements of military power reinforces this tacit understanding of Landpower.4 For example, while fleets
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and navies occasionally played vital roles throughout
history, even major naval victories such as the Battle
of the Virginia Capes in the American War of Independence, Trafalgar in the Napoleonic Wars, or Jutland in World War I, were adjuncts to the main events
on land.5 Even after American Alfred Thayer Mahan
and Briton Sir Julian Corbett distilled the essence of
a theory of sea or maritime power at the turn of the
20th century, command of the sea concerned (and still
does) only a few nations and powers.6
There is even less historical experience with and,
therefore, understanding of, the remaining elements
of military power. Air power is a 20th century phenomenon. Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, William
Mitchell, and other key contributors to the embryonic
theory of air power could emerge only after the invention of the airplane.7 Space is a late 20th century
phenomenon, and cyberspace, while originating in
the 20th century, is emerging in its own right only in
the first decades of the 21st century. Neither of these
last two elements of military power has yet found a
consensus prophet.8
All of these conditions have reinforced the historical precedent of Landpower as the dominant element of military power. Since the latter half of the
20th century, however, new technologies and ways of
employing those technologies have chipped away at
that traditional understanding. While terms such as
Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) or Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA) may now be passé, no one
disputes the accelerating changes in military technology that have occurred during the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Nor does the pace of change appear
to be slowing. These changes simultaneously and
paradoxically blur the dividing lines between where,
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when, and how the elements of military power might
be employed. As a result, the historical dominance of
Landpower may no longer translate into a self-evident
understanding of Landpower.
Oftentimes, loose terminology further compounds
misunderstanding. For instance, while professional
military and civilians tend to use the terms Landpower, armies, land forces, and land warfare interchangeably, these terms are not synonymous. Moreover, interpretation of these words, like beauty, often lies in
the eye of the beholder, and Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
and Marines frequently have different perceptions.
Even within large segments of land forces, interpretations will vary considerably depending upon whether
one is a Soldier or a Marine; has a strategic, operational, or tactical bias; is from a maneuver, operational
support, or force sustainment branch; or serves in a
particular unit or theater. These differing perspectives bleed over into official doctrine. While the Army
has defined Landpower, an official Joint definition of
Landpower still does not exist.9 Thus, while the Army
may have a particular view of Landpower, those outside the Army may not widely share that perspective.
The culmination of these factors too frequently
results in divisive debates that reinforce convictions
rather than clarify matters that help make U.S. military power and its land component more effective.
If senior military and defense advisors are to help
national leaders understand how best to orchestrate
the growing interdependence of air, cyberspace, land,
sea, and space power to promote and protect national
interests, they must understand both the capabilities
and limitations each power offers in conjunction with
the other components of military power. The recent
initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commander,
3

Special Operations Command to create the Strategic
Landpower Task Force “. . . to study the application
of landpower to achieve national objectives in the
future,” underscores this imperative.10
To that end, this monograph first places Landpower in an appropriate context. It then elaborates on the
concept of Landpower. Third, the monograph identifies the national and military elements of Landpower.
Next, it examines the potential roles and missions of
Landpower in the 21st century, to include an assessment of the strategic and operational versatility of
Landpower. To assist policymakers in making future
decisions, this assessment includes the strengths and
weaknesses of Landpower. Finally, the monograph
offers conclusions to spark a more informed debate on
the roles Landpower in the 21st century.
CONTEXT
Just as military power is but one instrument of
national power, Landpower is but one element of
military power. Military power combines with diplomatic, economic and informational power to form a
whole, while Landpower works with air, cyberspace,
sea and space power.11 Moreover, at the strategic
level, decisive results generally require orchestrating
more than one element of military power, oftentimes
in concert with other instruments of national power.
Thus, despite the claims of their more extreme advocates, rarely will air, cyberspace, land, sea, or space
power, alone, be sufficient to promote, let alone protect national interests. Granted, cases may arise where
one form of military power may play a dominant role.
However, for reasons explained more fully later, those
occasions will be rare.
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The term “conflict,” as opposed to warfare, generally will appear in this monograph. Conflict is a
broader term that better describes anticipated conditions that range from peacetime competition (e.g., economic rivalries, diplomatic friction, and ideological
antagonisms) through general war (to include the use
of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). Conflict also
encompasses a wide range of military operations indicated in Figure 1 that support U.S. national interests.
Peace

Conflict Continuum

War

Major Operations and Campaigns
Crisis response and
Limited Contingency Operations

Range of
Military
Operations

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation,
and Deterrence

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations.12
The Future Security Environment.
A detailed and predictive examination of the future security environment is unlikely to yield much
gain. While leaders someday may be able to divine the
distant future with precision, today is not likely to be
that day. Nor is tomorrow. Despite spending billions
of dollars, our foresight is constrained. As one senior
leader recently observed, even “the foreseeable future
isn’t really foreseeable.”13 Similarly, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has often remarked that
when it comes to predicting the future with precision,
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we have 100 percent accuracy—we have gotten zero
right.14 Worse, such a lack of clarity about the distant
future security environment all too frequently leads
to arguments over assumptions at the expense of the
primary focus on the issue at hand. This is particularly
true when engaging in debates over when and how to
employ military power. For example, specific scenarios oftentimes quickly come under fire from those who
do not agree on the need for X or Y conditions. Alternatively, critics may ridicule scenarios as fantasies or
“laundry lists” used as a way to avoid a substantive
discussion of the merits of a particular issue.
The foregoing is not an argument for not looking
ahead. Forecasting is necessary, but one must avoid
predictions that take focus away from the primary
task. In this vein, the author offers a few general observations to establish a broad context of the future
security environment that can facilitate an analysis of
Landpower. First, despite our ardent desires, conflict
is not going away. Long historical experience reinforces this fact, and current trends of the last 20-25 years
indicate more of the same for the next 20-25 years. We
also know from experience that unexpected security
challenges are likely to erupt on little or no notice. The
only forecast that has any degree of certainty is that
somewhere, sometime in the coming years (undoubtedly not at the time of our choosing) some country, organization, nonstate actor, or combination thereof will
place U.S. national security interests at sufficient risk
to require a military response. When, where, and how
that might occur is an open question, which means the
United States is unlikely to have the luxury of planning against discrete security challenges. These uncertainties will require the United States to anticipate and
prepare for a broad range of possible challenges.
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In planning for such a range of outcomes, U.S.
leaders would be wise to heed the sage advice of historian Sir Michael Howard, who years ago noted that
getting things exactly right was less important (as well
as less likely) than not getting things too wrong.15 Regardless, U.S. political and military leaders also will
have to hedge against unanticipated outcomes, the socalled “black swans” (such as using commercial airliners to attack buildings) that all too frequently arise.16
Lastly, one should never forget that adversaries and
competitors get a vote.
Military Elements of Power.
As indicated earlier, the accepted elements or components of military power include air, cyberspace,
land, sea, and space power. All five elements will remain relevant to future conflicts. The question is what
might be the appropriate blend of the five. There is
no current argument, compelling or otherwise, that
the traditional dominant elements of land, sea, and air
will fade from prominence any time soon. Nonetheless, space and cyberspace may take on larger roles
than heretofore.
For example, while this author agreed 16 years ago
that space overarched all physical domains, he argued
that space had not yet achieved status as a full-fledged
element of military power in its own right. The increasing dependence of modern military forces upon
capabilities based in space have called that conclusion
into question as the operations in the physical domain
of space have assumed greater importance in peace,
crisis, and war.17 Thus, while space presently continues to serve predominantly as an enabler of the other
elements of military power, it clearly has secured its
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place as a key element of military power. As space
capabilities continue to evolve, air, cyberspace, land,
and sea power may exploit the possibilities inherent
in space, and use of space assets and capabilities undoubtedly will increase.
Similarly, the 1998 monograph argued that it was
too soon to conclude definitively that cyberspace
would soon become a discrete element of military
power.18 The time has come to reconsider that conclusion. On the one hand, cyberspace and the information
that flows through it, like space, is a tool that supplements, complements, and, indeed, permeates all of
the existing elements of national and military power.
While cyberspace has its limits, costs, and potential
consequences, it might soon become an element of
military power in its own right if the virtual world and
artificial intelligence continue along their current trajectories. Until such a time, national and military leaders will have to obtain as complete an understanding
of cyberspace power and its strengths and weaknesses
as possible to ensure cyberspace power continues to
augment and enable the remaining elements of military power. Just like all elements of military power,
cyberspace power cannot be an end unto itself.
INTERDEPENDENCE
The 1998 monograph posited that interdependence—then defined as “orchestrating the appropriate
components of military power in ways that achieve
desired results”—would increasingly become the
norm for the U.S. military.19 The original monograph
argued that interdependence, as a concept, went beyond the then current scope of joint operations, which
essentially sought close cooperation among the Ser-
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vices to achieve military and national objectives.20
At the time, this author argued that interdependence
would go beyond integration of Service capabilities
to the point where Services would depend upon each
other for the performance of the majority of the roles,
missions, and tasks that national leaders call upon the
Armed Forces of the United States to perform. That
idea has been borne out by historical experience over
the last 16 years. Indeed, military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan have raised interdependence from a
hypothetical concept to a fact of modern U.S. warfare,
as Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces,
now defines joint interdependence as “. . . the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s
capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both (i.e., synergy), the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances.”21
While this definition is a good first step, a better
understanding of how interdependence has and will
continue to evolve will be imperative for effective
U.S. responses to the future demands of the 21st century security environment.22 Only by thoroughly understanding of how Services and Special Operations
Forces can contribute to air, cyberspace, land, sea, and
space power will the U.S. military be able to maximize
the effectiveness of interdependent operations. As
importantly, anticipated budget constraints and demands of the international security environment will
make interdependence a necessity.
One of the key tenets of interdependent operations is that no one element of military power (or its
contributing Services) exists in isolation. Under this
author’s conception of interdependent operations,
every element operates in multiple domains and supports the other elements. In interdependent opera-
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tions, therefore, the question is not which element of
military power to apply. Rather, the key question is,
what is the most appropriate mix of elements given
the circumstances, missions, and capabilities required? In other words, interdependence results from
the synergy gained by appropriately orchestrating
the elements of U.S. military (and national) power to
influence an opponent at least cost. The metaphor of
a tapestry best illustrates, perhaps, this concept. The
respective elements of military power (and their contributing Services) represent the threads that make up
the tapestry. Individual threads, while essential for
creating the tapestry, cannot create a picture. Even
collectively, a picture emerges only when the weaver
works the threads in a carefully planned and executed
pattern. Extending the metaphor to demonstrate the
extensive capabilities inherent in interdependent operations of the Services, a weaver can weave any number of threads and patterns to create endless varieties
of pictures.
Paradoxically, the future orchestration of these
multiple capabilities will be both easier and harder as
the clear distinctions between the elements of military
power continue to blur. For example, from ancient
times through the mid-20th century, states exercised
sea power primarily against other ships. Granted, limited operations against coastal fortifications and ports,
and amphibious operations occasionally occurred.
However, the application of sea power on land was
limited to a narrow coastal strip. Today, carrier based
aviation and cruise missiles extend the reach of sea
power asymmetrically deep into the hinterland and
airspace of most states. Amphibious operations can
reach well beyond shorelines to strike deep into littoral areas, as well. Thus, sea power extends into the
air and land elements of military power.
10

Similarly, in its infancy, air power initially reconnoitered ground forces. Quickly, however, the ability to attack ground targets from the air opened up
the possibility of influencing land combat.23 Eventually, the range of aircraft permitted air forces to strike
deep into an opponent’s territory directly to attack its
war making potential. These capabilities also allowed
similar missions far out to sea. The advent of intercontinental bombers, atomic weapons, and missiles
provided air power global reach—in the air, on land,
and at sea.
In the last half century, Landpower also has
moved well beyond the confines of ground operations. Today’s armies possess missiles that range the
upper reaches of the atmosphere to counter opposing
aircraft and to provide ballistic missile defense. Many
armies hold significant air power in the form of transport and attack helicopters. The dividing line between
close air support of ground operations provided by
fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters continues
to thin. The addition of ground-to-ground missiles of
increasing range, precision, and lethality may further
reduce air power’s role in supporting land warfare.24
The likelihood of helicopter to helicopter or helicopter to fixed-wing combat aircraft engagement further
smudges the dividing line between air and Landpower. Landpower also provides security for air bases, and, historically, Landpower asymmetrically has
denied enemy air forces operating bases.25
Similarly, land and sea power are interlinked. As
the noted British naval theorist, Sir Julian Corbett,
stated over 100 years ago, sea power exists predominantly to transport land forces and support land operations.26 Landpower historically has defeated sea
power by seizing enemy harbors and seaports from
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the land.27 Conversely, as China’s Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) concept portends, ground-based
anti-ship missiles have considerable potential to influence operations far out at sea, especially in the littoral
regions. Such influence undoubtedly will increase as
technology improves.28
The critical issue facing future national leaders and
military planners, therefore, is not identifying which
element of military power—air, cyberspace, land, sea,
or space—will dominate the future security environment. Indeed, such arguments and discussions—usually conducted with intense passion—generate much
counterproductive ill will. Rather, in most cases along
the conflict spectrum, success will require the application of more than one type of force and power.29 The
key question will be how best to blend the components
of military (and usually national) power to provide
the desired result.
Figure 2 reflects this broader view of military power and the relationships among air, cyberspace, land,
sea, and space power. This notional diagram conveys
a number of key concepts. First, as indicated earlier,
military power is composed of multiple, subordinate
components: air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space.
Second, specific force types provide the basis for component power, but they do not automatically equate
to power (i.e., land forces are subsumed within but
do not equate to Landpower). Third, the intersection
of a force type with another component indicates that
forces can contribute to other components of military
power, as well (e.g., air forces with land or sea power).
Cyberspace and space envelop the remaining three inextricably intertwined elements; thus, military power
stems from the synergistic and mutually supporting
interaction of all five components.
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Figure 2. Interdependence.
Although not portrayed in the pictograph (for
reasons of clarity), the interaction of the other instruments of national power (political, economic, and
diplomatic) with the military instrument is equally
important for understanding how nations generate
and apply power. These instruments could intersect
the outer circle of military power, or one or more of
the components, depending upon the particular conditions. Nevertheless, the message should be clear: the
blending of suitable tools, not an individual instrument, usually leads to success.
In such a notional chart, air or sea power easily could have served as the central point. Moreover,
the actual distribution of responsibilities among the
forces and components would vary according to the
missions, tasks, and desired outcomes. Specific condi-
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tions, such as potential opponent, terrain or environment, forces at hand, time available, and the desired
national policy objective, also would influence the selection and application of components. In certain cases,
one type of force or element of military power might
predominate in a particular mission. For example, in
conducting Operation FREEDOM FALCON (Libya,
2011), air power—whether land- or sea-based—played
the predominant role. Initial operations in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, on the other
hand, highlighted the close cooperation between air
power and Special Operations Forces. Similarly, U.S.
Marines launched from air- and sea-based platforms
into land-locked Kandahar Province.
Initial operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, on the other hand, underscored how the simultaneous integration and synchronization of all elements of military power can generate overwhelming
combat power. Once the insurgency broke out after
U.S. military toppled Saddam’s regime, however,
Landpower (to include Special Operations Forces)
once again became the primary tool of the U.S. military effort. To be sure, air, cyberspace, sea, and space
forces contributed to the fight, but ground forces provided the overwhelming proportion of military power
employed.
Despite the interdependence that will characterize most modern military operations, planners must
keep in mind that the rising occurrence and significance of interdependent operations does not diminish the importance of any one element of military
power. Interdependence will not mean the complete
merging of Services or the disappearance of unique
forces. There will continue to be missions or tasks that
only Soldiers, Marines, airplanes, ships, electrons, or
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satellites can accomplish. Thus, the drive to interdependence must ensure that the U.S. military retains
the requisite unique Service capabilities within the
physical domains.
Interdependence also will require national and
military leaders to capitalize on the strengths and
minimize weaknesses of the individual components.
To do so, leaders must first understand the capabilities of each type of military power. They can then
determine how best to orchestrate these capabilities
to produce desired outcomes, while preventing an
adversary from exploiting potential vulnerabilities. In
some cases, this may mean that a single component of
military power will dominate. In others, it will require
the careful orchestration of two or more components
to achieve decisive results. In a metaphorical sense,
this means having the suitable tools in the toolkit for
the problems of the 21st century security environment. For example, when needing pliers, one hopes
to find more than screwdrivers and Allen wrenches.
Alternatively, one could use a flat tip screwdriver in
lieu of a wood chisel, but the results may be much less
efficient and effective. At the same time, such use may
damage the screwdriver. One could easily extend the
metaphor to the idea of having multiple toolkits (components of military power) and being able to draw
the most suitable tools from one or more toolkits to
address a particular tactical, operational, or strategic
level issue.
Specific conditions also will influence force composition. For example, conflict in restricted terrain
such as mountains and cities, especially where “collateral damage” is a concern, may limit most activity
to land forces. Similarly, within certain smaller-scale
contingencies, such as humanitarian assistance, peace

15

support, peace enforcement, or counterinsurgency operations, land forces may have much more utility than
air- or sea-based forces, which may be better suited
to punish or compel. Equally, air and sea power have
areas that will remain their preserve. Control of the air
and sea largely (but not solely) will remain the functions of forces that contribute to air and sea power.30
Unless circumstances or technological developments
change dramatically, sea power will continue to provide the means to carry out amphibious operations.
Large-scale air transportation will be an air power
capability, just as sea transportation undergirds sea
power. Cyberspace and space power will undoubtedly contribute. Rarely, however, will either be the
primary driver of success.
Notwithstanding the increased interdependence
of the elements of military power, policymakers and
military practitioners must ensure that they do not
take the principle to unnecessary extremes. Once
more resorting to an analogy, consider the Leatherman tool. Regardless of size, a Leatherman tool has
wonderful utility; however, it also has limitations. It
has pliers, but not the best. It has two screwdrivers,
but only one size of each type. It has a saw, but no one
will cut many two by fours with it.31
Nor should leaders pursue interdependent operations simply to ensure that Services get their “piece of
the action.” As Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed
mission to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran in 1980,
reminds, such provisions can be not simply counterproductive, but catastrophic.32 Instead, leaders and
planners need to implement interdependence carefully to achieve national policy objectives with appropriate efficiency and, more importantly, greatest
effectiveness. This will not be easy.
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LAND POWER IN THE 21st CENTURY
Landpower Defined.
In 2005, Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army, promulgated the Army’s first official definition of Landpower:
“Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control
over land, resources, and people.”33 Seven years later,
Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army, retained the
original definition from FM-1, but slightly expanded
the explanation of Landpower to include:
•	Impose the nation’s will on an enemy, by force
if necessary.
•	Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter
in any operational environment.
•	Establish and maintain a stable environment
that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
•	
Address the consequences of catastrophic
events—both natural and man-made—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil
services.
•	
Secure and support bases from which joint
forces can influence and dominate the air,
land, and maritime domains of an operational
environment.34
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ELEMENTS OF LANDPOWER
Landpower stems from a wide variety of factors.
For convenience, these determinants fall into national
and military elements that, in aggregate, contribute to
Landpower.
National Elements.
At the national level, a broad range of factors
contributes to Landpower. Historically, for instance,
geo-strategic conditions have exerted considerable
influence over which component would be the most
dominant form of military power. Continental powers,
such as Russia, Germany, China, India, and France,
historically have relied primarily on Landpower.35
Granted, states or empires with extensive access to the
seas (for example, Spain, the Netherlands, and France)
sometimes maintained a considerable sea-based force
and sought to establish themselves as sea powers, but
concern for land warfare and Landpower prevailed
overwhelmingly over time.36 Still, today, most nations rely primarily on ground forces to fulfill their
security needs.
Even for the United States, the world’s foremost
naval power, distinctions over whether the United
States is a continental or a maritime power are increasingly irrelevant. The United States has global interests.
Because of the diverse geography and geo-strategic
conditions of where U.S. national interests lie, the
United States will have to possess all components of
national military power, to include Landpower. The
more pertinent question, therefore, is not which form
of military power should predominate, but what proportion of forces and power will most effectively meet
the specific conditions of a particular event or crisis.
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Economic power obviously has a defining influence on the ability to build and sustain Landpower.
This stems not only from the general state of the
economy, but extends into how much of that economy
is devoted to military power, in general, and Landpower, in particular. The extent of the military and
civil industrial base (especially the degree to which
the civilian base can easily convert to military use)
also will contribute to or detract from Landpower. So
too will the ability to generate and sustain technological innovation over time. A country’s economic infrastructure, particularly communications, information,
transportation, and financial networks, will influence
the ability to project Landpower. Finally, as the rise
and fall of empires, such as Spain, Britain, Russia,
Germany, Japan, and the United States, amply demonstrates, states must match their economic capacity
to meet their security interests or suffer what historian
Paul Kennedy termed as “overstretch.”37
Population and the ability to mobilize that population for economic and military ends also affect Landpower. Obviously, the traditional markers of size,
distribution, demographics, class structure, and education will influence the degree of economic power
and personnel available for military use. Of increasing importance will be the subset of populace mentally and physically qualified to serve, as well as their
propensity to join the Armed Forces.38
Lastly, the strategic culture of populations will
shape the employment of Landpower. For example,
Britain’s long seafaring tradition and distrust of standing armies led to a strong navy and small army that
relied on allies to assume the major burden of land
warfare. Conversely, primarily continental powers,
such as France, Germany, and Russia relied heavily
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on land forces and largely failed as sea powers. Since
World War II, the United States has been globally
engaged. Whether the United States will sustain that
commitment or return to more traditional policies of
avoiding foreign entanglements and fielding a small
standing army remains to be seen.
The form of government affects the nature of
Landpower and its employment. Authoritarian political systems, for example, may depend heavily upon
Landpower to maintain their regimes. Thus, they pose
a threat to their populations as well as to their neighbors. This may result in bifurcated force structures
capable of offensive operations against neighbors, as
well as gendarmerie or heavily armed security forces
for internal control. Conversely, democratic governments may have little or no call to use their military
domestically other than for disaster relief or rare and
targeted support of civil authorities. Externally, despite the notion that democratic nations have fewer
propensities to use military power, democracies will
resort to force when their national interests are at
stake. In addition, they will structure their forces for
offensive and defensive purposes.
The national will to use Landpower, particularly
in the modern age, has a significant influence on its
eventual employment. In sum, the best-manned,
equipped, and trained force in the world can be largely irrelevant without the national will to wield that
potential; or, at the least, not to oppose its use. The
national will to employ Landpower may vary considerably depending upon several factors. First, the nature of national interests involved and the degree of
risk to those interests will influence national will. A
vital national interest at high risk may make generating national will easier. However, one needs look no
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further than Britain and France in the Inter-War Era
to see that such may not always be the case. Similarly,
the current U.S. reluctance post-Iraq and Afghanistan
to employ Landpower for less than perceived vital
national interests offers another viewpoint. Despite
this reluctance, however, many nations, including the
United States, appear willing to allow land power to
participate in military engagement activities, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief missions even when vital or important
national interests are not at stake.
Military Elements.
The core of Landpower obviously stems from the
ground forces (Army, Marine, and Special Operations
Forces; active and reserve components) that are available. Nevertheless, ground forces alone do not represent the full extent of a nation’s Landpower. Instead,
national and military leaders should think of Landpower in terms of ground forces operating interdependently with the other elements of the U.S. Armed
Forces, in coalition with allies and partners, in conjunction with government agencies, and in collaboration with international organizations to promote and
protect national interests.
The institutions that generate and sustain those
forces are equally important to Landpower. In short,
the recruiting, training, equipping, maintaining, and
sustaining functions that generate and undergird the
capabilities of the fighting force are equally essential
for creating and sustaining land power. Also important are the doctrinal procedures and systems that create and sustain the common operating culture that allow forces to operate most effectively. Equally critical
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to an effectively functioning force are the leadership,
discipline, and morale that bind the force together. In
addition, for a nation with global interests, the ability
to project forces to the point of crisis in sufficient time
to act effectively and to sustain those forces constitutes
a key element of Landpower.
The human dimension of military power is nothing new. Indeed, the importance of the human dimension has been well documented since Thucydides
wrote his history, The Peloponnesian War, nearly 2,400
years ago.39 Machiavelli and Clausewitz likewise saw
the centrality of the human dimension. More modern
strategists or historians, such as Colin Gray, Michael
Howard, John Keegan, Williamson Murray, and Hew
Strachan, have continued to stress the vital importance of the human dimension for understanding war
and warfare.40
Modern militaries, especially their Landpower
components, depend heavily on the ability of innovative, adaptive individuals who can react quickly to
rapidly changing conditions. To be successful, land
forces must recruit and retain high quality personnel,
and train and mold them into cohesive teams. This
cohesion stems from individual and collective morale
and esprit de corps that creates a synergistic whole far
greater than the aggregate of individual talents. Without this reservoir of talent, Landpower cannot hope
to prevail. Indeed, Landpower, more than the other
components of military power, depends upon human
interaction and innovation for success.41 Assuredly, all
components of military power rely upon high quality
personnel; but there is one key difference. Air and sea
forces essentially employ weapons systems or support
platforms that require people to operate them. Land
forces, conversely, tend to recruit people and then
equip them.
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One should not confuse the concept of the human
dimension with the recently proposed concept of a
human domain comparable to air, cyberspace, land,
maritime, and space domains.42 Proponents of establishing a separate and distinct human domain may
be unnecessarily muddying the issue. Wars quintessentially are fought between and among humans for
control of, or at least influence on, human will. Such
control usually (but not always) requires defeat of an
opponent’s armed forces or control of an adversary’s
land or population. While air and sea power (and increasingly cyberspace and space power) can temporarily deny control of a particular space or may assist
in taking control, they cannot sustain that control on
their own.43 Only Landpower can seize and, importantly, sustain control for a prolonged period. Finally,
although some humans live on the sea, some fly in the
air, and an increasing number may utilize cyberspace,
the fact remains that the overwhelming bulk of humanity occupies the land. Proponents of a separate human domain, therefore, may be making a distinction
without a difference that will not withstand scrutiny.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
VERSATILITY: ROLES AND MISSIONS
OF LANDPOWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY44
Landpower will continue to have tremendous utility in peace, crisis, and war, and across the conflict
spectrum from peaceful competition to general war.
Within war, Landpower will continue to apply across
all levels of warfare—tactical, operational, and strategic.45 For these reasons and more (as will become
apparent), Landpower will continue to play a critical
role in the fundamental purposes of military power:
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defeat, deter, compel, reassure, shape, and support to
the nation.46
Defeat.
Defeat of an opponent’s forces seems a relatively
straightforward proposition. As previously indicated,
however, defeating an enemy’s military is a necessary,
but insufficient first step. In some cases, defeat of a
country’s military forces may be sufficient to control
the will of an opponent’s leadership. In other cases,
defeating an adversary’s military forces may not
translate into political victory. As the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan reinforce, victory may require bending
the will of an adversary’s populace, which normally
requires prolonged control of those people. While air,
cyberspace, sea, and space power can deny control for
discrete periods, they cannot sustain long-term physical or psychological control, and in many cases, cyber
and space power may be largely irrelevant. Such a
level of control usually requires Landpower.47
Deter.
Deterrence, according to Stanford University professors Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George,
occurs when a potential adversary concludes that the
cost of an action is not worth the potential outcome.48
For most of history, Landpower provided the overwhelming bulk of deterrent capability. In the latter
half of the 20th century, however, air and sea power,
especially when augmented with nuclear weapons,
added significantly to the calculus of deterrence.
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Deterrence in the future, however, may take on a
different form than in the recent past and require some
changes in the military contribution to that role. The
emergence of rogue states, or nonstate actors, with access to nuclear devices or material, but who do not
share the long-standing and highly developed culture
of deterrence that emerged during the Cold War, may
further complicate deterrence. Equally disturbing is
the rise of states, transnational organizations, criminal
groups, and terrorists that may come into the possession of chemical or biological agents. Because such
groups might harbor the perception that there is little
likelihood of facing effective retribution, or might be
indifferent to such punishment, a threat of nuclear retaliation may not suffice.49 Moreover, as many states
and actors do not possess nuclear weapons, nuclear
retaliation would likely appear disproportionate to
the world community and, therefore, is unlikely to be
credible. Finally, the absence of superpower competition may diminish the heretofore-dominant role of
nuclear weapons within deterrence policy.50
Conventional forces, therefore, are likely to play
a larger deterrent role than in the recent past and
the nature of that role may expand. If, for example,
a country retains an activist policy of intervening in
areas to ensure stability, then the number of potential
actors to be deterred may be substantial. Second, the
risks posed by potential adversaries will fall across
a broader range of the conflict spectrum than was
the case with the relatively limited requirements of
nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Third, deterrence depends on communication—messages clearly
sent and understood. However, cross-cultural communications, which undoubtedly will increase, can be
exceptionally difficult.51 Because of this rising impor-
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tance of conventional deterrence, policymakers will
have to devote increased attention to designing credible deterrent mechanisms, such as coalitions and alliances, force presence and deployments, and enforced
sanctions and embargoes.52
Under these cumulative circumstances, Landpower likely will expand its long-standing contribution
to deterrence.53 The fact that many regional powers
remain predominantly land powers reinforces this
likelihood.54 This is not to argue for Landpower’s dominance in deterrence. Certainly, air and sea power will
remain significant contributors to deterrence; however, Landpower has more ability to deter across a wider
portion of the conflict spectrum than may be the case
with the other components of military power.55
Compel.
As political scientist and policy practitioner Thomas Schelling noted in 1966, compellence involves the
use or threat of force to get an adversary to do what
you want.56 Compellence can range from defeat of an
opponent’s military forces to punishment to the limited use of force to achieve goals to the threat of force to
obtain desired objectives. These latter nuances fall under what Craig and George term coercive diplomacy,
where policymakers apply, individually or in concert,
the military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of
national power to “persuade” another actor to adopt a
particular course of action.57
Coercive diplomacy is not new; indeed, recorded
history offers countless examples. Even in the Cold
War, when the risks of escalation to superpower
nuclear confrontation tended to circumscribe coercive diplomacy, policymakers had to make difficult

26

choices against the backdrop of the communist threat
and the possibility of escalation. The decreased potential for nuclear confrontation, however, may reduce
the encumbrances on the use of military power and
could lead to coercive diplomacy assuming a larger
role in future U.S. policy.58
Coercive diplomacy usually demands a blend of the
instruments of national power that are context sensitive, are appropriate to achieve the national objectives
involved at the lowest possible cost, and are within an
acceptable level of risk. Military power, when used as
an effectual tool of diplomacy, offers national leaders
a broad range of policy options. Landpower, in particular, can respond to low-level conflict, conduct all
missions associated with peace operations, participate
in smaller-scale contingencies (such as raids, strikes,
or limited campaigns), or help prosecute a major theater war. Naturally, the effectiveness of Landpower’s
contribution will vary with the conditions, as will
those of air, cyberspace, sea, and space power. Because
Landpower is the principal source of military power
for many states and actors, Landpower represents the
ultimate form of compellence. The emphasis here is
that Landpower uniquely can place an opponent’s
sovereignty at risk.59 This combination offers national
leaders an extensive set of options for responding to a
particular event or crisis.
(Re)Assure.60
Reassurance, according to historian and strategist
Sir Michael Howard, who coined the term, “. . . provides a general sense of security that is not specific to
any threat or scenario.”61 The purpose of assurance,
however, is not simply to keep allies and friends
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contented. Assurance serves a country’s interests by
advancing national values and beliefs; promoting regional stability; improving cooperation among allies,
partners, friends, and, occasionally, adversaries; reducing the perceived need for military competition;
and cultivating good will. All of these elements (and
more) contribute to an improved international security environment that ultimately benefits not only individual nations, but also the global community.
While the presence of air and sea power can assure friends and allies, these partners sometimes may
perceive these elements of military power as transient
demonstrations of U.S. resolve. In addition, continental nations or regional powers who do not have a long
tradition of relying on air or sea power do not necessarily see these elements as an ultimate guarantor.62
While the importance of the assurance role may have
diminished somewhat in the wake of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, recent aggressive Russian actions
in the Caucasus and, especially, Crimea and Ukraine
once more have brought assurance of regional actors
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the fore. The dispatch of U.S. land forces to
Poland and the Baltic States in response to ongoing
Russian aggression once more reinforces that Landpower offers the highest level of national commitment to a partner’s sovereignty, offering considerable
assurance.
Similarly, recent Chinese activities in East Asia
have renewed the importance of assuring U.S. partners and allies in the region. As envisaged in AirSea
Battle, air and sea power are likely to play major parts
in assurance, but there is a growing recognition that
Landpower still has a vital role to play under that concept. Nor have key allies forgotten about U.S. Land-
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power presence on the Korean Peninsula, or the role
of ground forces in the Philippines.63
Engagement.
The U.S. military also has a significant stake in the
peacetime promotion and protection of U.S. national
interests and objectives. Over the last 2 decades, the
use of the military instrument of power to help shape
the international security environment has grown in
importance. Generally, shaping activities may include:
•	
Rotational deployments for exercises and
training.
•	Foreign attendance in U.S. professional military education activities.
• Building partner capacity.
• Security force assistance.
•	
Civil affairs support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts.
• Foreign internal defense.
•	
Counterterrorism and support to counterterrorism.
•	Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.64
Additionally, the U.S. Armed Forces can expect increased contributions to the already significant levels
of peacetime engagement missions: peacekeeping or
other peace operations (e.g., support to diplomacy,
peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), nation assistance, military-to-military contacts,
and security assistance.65 Indeed, recent history has
demonstrated the nature and scope of such support.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief will no
doubt remain critical engagement activities.66
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While all elements of national military power support engagement activities, Landpower is the most
significant contributor. This is not to argue that air
and sea power do not participate in engagement activities. U.S. air and sea forces, for example, are key contributors to humanitarian assistance operations. Few
civilian organizations in the world or even most militaries have the capability to move massive amounts
of supplies as quickly and as effectively to the point
of natural or man-made crisis. Equally, air and sea
power, individually or in combination with the other
components of national military power, help promote
stability in key regions of the world through exercises,
information sharing, and military-to-military contacts.
Air and sea power also provide capabilities needed to
prevent or reduce conflicts and threats.
Landpower, nonetheless, still offers the greatest
number of options and operational flexibility. Moreover, most current and anticipated partners rely predominantly on land forces for their security. Much
of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, have predominantly land-oriented forces and
land security issues. In Europe, air, cyberspace, sea,
and space power clearly have roles to play, but again,
Landpower predominates. Even in parts of Asia,
where sea and air forces logically may have a larger
role, land forces will still play a considerable part.
Thus, Landpower frequently offers policymakers the
most suitable instrument of military power.
Support to the Nation.
The importance of the critical roles outlined above
oftentimes overshadow another vital military role:
support to the nation. The U.S. military and, espe-
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cially the Army, historically have provided considerable domestic support.67 While the next decades will
pose challenges different from the 19th and early 20th
centuries, the U.S. military will remain engaged in domestic support operations. Missions could vary from
traditional disaster relief and support of civil authorities to combating international crime, drug trafficking,
and terrorism; to contributing to border and refugee
control; to assisting in the rebuilding of national infrastructure; to responding to ecological disasters; even
to supporting the delivery of health care to underserved segments of U.S. society.
Once again, most of these tasks fall to the forces that
comprise the basis for Landpower. Other components
of military power contribute, but the reality is that
the capabilities inherent in air and sea power and the
environments in which they operate limit their ability to perform most support roles. Thus, the greatest
portion of these missions and tasks fall to land forces,
specifically the Army.
Specific Roles and Missions.
While a useful starting point, the conceptual underpinnings outlined earlier are only a first step. A
necessary second step is to identify more specific roles
and missions that U.S. military power, generally, and
Landpower, specifically, can expect to perform. Fortunately, a number of key legal, policy, and doctrinal
publications establish the most important roles and
missions of Landpower. While not exhaustive, the outline that follows offers sufficient extracts from a few
key documents that underscore the number, breadth,
and scope of missions that U.S. military power, and
specifically Landpower, can expect to carry out on behalf of the nation.
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At the level of the Department of Defense (DoD),
the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 established three
pillars of U.S. Defense Strategy that influence the roles
and missions of Landpower: protect the homeland,
build global security, project power and win decisively.68 In a similar vein, The National Military Strategy,
2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership stipulated that the U.S. military and, hence, Landpower, must
be able to counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional
security, and shape the future force.69
Key Joint and Service leaders have expanded
these general requirements to include more specific
missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. For example, in
Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills, General
Raymond T. Odierno (Chief of Staff, Army), General
James F. Amos (Commandant, USMC), and Admiral
William H. McRaven (Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command) have identified the following primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces:
• Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare;
• Deter and Defeat Aggression;
•	Project Power Despite Anti-Access Area Denial Challenges;
• Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction;
• Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space;
•	Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear
Deterrent;
•	Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to
Civil Authorities;
• Provide a Stabilizing Presence;
•	Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency
Operations; and,
•	Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and
Other Operations.70
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For the Army, specifically, 10 U.S. Code 3062
clearly establishes that:
It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is
capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces,
of:
(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing
for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied
by the United States;
(2) supporting the national policies;
(3) implementing the national objectives; and,
(4) 
overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the
United States.71

The law further details that the Army “. . . shall be
organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt
and sustained combat [emphasis added] incident to
operations on land.”72
Taking into account all of this guidance (and
more), Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP)-1, The Army,
identifies the current core and enabling competencies for the Army, which also apply more generally to
Landpower:
• Core Competencies
— Combined arms maneuver
— Wide area security
— Special operations
• Enabling Competencies
— Support security cooperation
— Tailor forces for the combatant commander
— Conduct entry operations
— Provide flexible mission command
— Support domestic civil authorities
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The limited guidance outlined here underscores
the number and scope of the roles and mission that
Landpower (as part of interdependent operations) can
expect to perform. Moreover, the events of the last 2
decades have amply demonstrated that these roles
and missions are not merely hypothetical. Nor are
they likely to be hypothetical in the near term. Granted, some may argue that the future can be different
from the past—and perhaps it can be. Recent trends
and enduring U.S. national interests argue, however,
that Landpower can expect more of the same for the
near future.
A key reason behind the reasonable expectation
that national leaders will continue to call frequently
upon Landpower capabilities is that Landpower offers tremendous utility across almost the entire spectrum of military conflict. (See Figure 3.) As the last 2
decades amply illustrate, Landpower offers significant versatility across the entire spectrum of conflict
and throughout the range of military operations. In
the last decade, alone, this performance has extended
from support to domestic authorities to peacetime
engagement activities to shaping the international
security environment, to responding to smaller-scale
contingencies to joint and combined operations in a
two theaters of war.
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Figure 3. Utility Along the Spectrum
of Military Conflict.
Highlighting the versatility of Landpower in no
way diminishes the utility of the other elements of military power. Cyberspace and space power, however,
tend to play complementary rather than individually
decisive roles. Air and sea power will remain critical
elements for most scenarios and under the right conditions can play decisive individual roles. Indeed, the
further to the right on the conflict spectrum, the more
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effective air and sea power become. However, the further left on the conflict spectrum the generally less effective and, therefore, less appropriate they may be.
Of course, Landpower is not without its limitations. When projected beyond home shores or overseas
bases, Landpower depends upon air and sea power
for deployment, as well as long-term sustainment and
support. Without friendly control of the air and seas,
land operations are difficult, if not impossible, to carry out and sustain.74 When engaged in most smallerscale contingencies and, certainly, major theater war,
Landpower depends heavily upon the capabilities
that air and sea power bring to the conflict. Certainly,
cyberspace and space power provide critical enabling
capabilities.
Employing ground forces also can present a number of obstacles. First, Landpower may be slower to
deploy and may lack the relative ability to strike deep
quickly or in as great strength as air and sea power.
Second, Landpower also is more prone to friction than
the other elements of military power. As analyst Lukas Milevski points out, “Landpower, of all forms of
power, has perhaps the greatest density of moving
parts; particularly so if one considers all the support it
requires to operate effectively.”75 The greater the number of units usually involved in ground operations
only compounds these frictions. Weather and terrain
also exacerbate these conditions. Additionally, for the
near future, opposing land forces have a greater opportunity to disrupt land operations than an adversary’s air or sea forces may have to disrupt operations
in those domains.76
Third, because land forces represent the highest
perceived level of U.S. commitment—domestically,
as well, as externally—conditions may have to reach
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crisis proportions before decisionmakers commit
Landpower. Such delays may inhibit earlier employment that might have eased circumstances before
they erupted in full-blown crisis. Alternatively, deployment of insufficient land forces may encourage
an aggressor to act before forces are fully capable of
responding. Lastly, if deployed, land forces may be
difficult to disengage from active conflicts.77
Fourth, an aversion to danger and casualties may
inhibit the use of Landpower. Land forces can be the
most susceptible to casualties, and the numbers of
land forces and their proximity to danger, especially
armed opponents, raises the likelihood of casualties.78
Policymakers, therefore, may view employing Landpower with apprehension. Certainly, since the end of
the Cold War, particularly when U.S. ground forces
were committed with less than vital national interests
at stake, public and political anxiety over U.S. casualties reached significant levels. Whether this trend will
continue in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is an open question, but it is possible that such
concerns could spill over into crises where important
or vital U.S. interests are involved.79
In this regard, a perception exists that air and sea
power offer a more bloodless—friendly, enemy, or civilian—form of warfare. Part of this perception stems
from an American infatuation with technology. Air
and sea forces tend to use technologically sophisticated platforms that simultaneously make land forces
seem archaic while offering the tempting chimera
of weapons that can strike with precision from afar
without drawing friendly or too much enemy blood.
Compounding the fascination with technology is the
manpower intensive nature of Landpower operations
that may expose more American sons and daughters
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to injury and death. Nonetheless, as the supposedly
inadvertent Iraqi attack on the USS Stark (1987), the
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia (1996), and
the attack on the USS Cole (2000) illustrate, sea and air
forces also are vulnerable to such casualties.
Finally, land operations oftentimes have much
greater media and public transparency than those on
the sea and in the air where media reporters and cameras seldom go. Granted, an errant bomb can grab a
headline, but most of what happens on the sea or in
the air, space, and cyberspace lies beyond the normal
reach of media attention. Land operations, however,
can come under considerable scrutiny. As a result,
if something goes wrong, it is more apparent, more
prone to publicity, and more likely to affect U.S.
reputation and interests than operations in the other
domains.80
If recognized, however, these limitations can be
offset or ameliorated. In some instances, the other elements of military power can take up the slack or fill
in the gaps. Alternatively, leaders and planners may
have to recognize the negative aspects and work within them. For example, Landpower holds the potential
for higher levels of casualties. As a nation, we need to
recognize now that national interests at some future
point may cause casualties and build the necessary
resilience into the national will. We should not accept
the illusion that some other instrument of national
military power offers a “clean,” casualty free (for the
United States, at least) option.
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CONCLUSIONS: LANDPOWER—A MEANS TO
AN END, NOT AN END
An increasingly uncertain and ambiguous international security environment, combined with the complexity of modern warfare, argues for greater clarification of what Landpower means in 21st century terms.
These circumstances do not presuppose that the previous essence of Landpower, understood for ages, is
no longer relevant. Nothing could be further from the
truth, for as the analysis indicates, many of the enduring elements of Landpower remain relevant. Nonetheless, the evolution of Landpower and the growing
volatility of the international security environment
argue for a more comprehensive understanding of the
future roles of Landpower. Equally important, such
understanding will assist national leaders in more effectively orchestrating Landpower in concert with the
air, cyberspace, sea, and space elements of military
power to achieve greater interdependence.
Rarely will such orchestration be easy. Leaders
will have to strip away the more extreme or aggressive claims of advocates of a particular component of
military power, and identify which capabilities are
best suited for a particular task. Because of the dynamic nature of conflict and conditions, such deliberations will be necessary for nearly every new mission.
Undoubtedly, jurisdictional quarrels among elements
of military power and Services will resurface. While
these issues deserve debate, and competitive analysis
oftentimes identifies opportunities, key leaders cannot
allow such frictions to degenerate into “turf battles”
so common over the last half-century.
As a first step in reducing the number, scope, and
severity of such turf battles, leaders must not only
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recognize, but act in accord with, the fact that no one
element of military power can provide comprehensive
capabilities for every contingency across the entire
spectrum. No ground force commander, for example,
wants to enter into battle without U.S. air superiority
or control of the sea. At the same time, no advocate of
Landpower would ever propose that land forces conduct naval operations or seize command of the sea.
Yet, air and sea power advocates sometimes propose
that they can unilaterally achieve land control.81
A better understanding of Landpower that includes strengths and limitations will help policymakers in making future decisions. Only with such a comprehensive understanding will leaders and planners
be able to identify not only the capabilities required,
but as importantly, from whence those capabilities
should come. Absent such understanding, policy and
the execution of strategy to implement that policy
will suffer.
Landpower’s greatest contribution to overall national military power is its inherent versatility. This
versatility stems from the types and range of activities Landpower can undertake, and the ability of land
forces quickly to adapt existing organizations to meet
the demands of a particular mission profile or rapidly
changing tactical, operational, or strategic conditions.
Landpower capabilities offer national leaders the
broadest range of options for handling opportunities
or crises. These options cannot be matched by other
elements of military power because they are limited
by the domains in which they operate or by the nature
of their equipment. Landpower’s utility is particularly
evident along the lower portions of the conflict spectrum. Here, operations rely less on a technological
response from a “system of systems” to mass deadly
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effects and more on human interaction, which Landpower is best suited to supply. This may be especially
true for most peacetime engagement and shaping
activities.
Not least, the human dimension will continue to
dominate war and warfare. Indeed, successful military
operations will still rely on the human capacity to react quickly to a highly fluid and nuanced environment
to produce decisive results. In counterinsurgency or
state-building activities, people usually will be more
effective than platform-based solutions.82 Immersed in
the human dimension, Landpower is the most capable
component of military power in this most critical of
all realms.
A good understanding of Landpower is not an end
unto itself. This analysis is only a first step in building
an understanding of how to orchestrate land, air, cyberspace, sea, and space power to conduct interdependent operations, where the whole is greater than the
sum of the aggregate capabilities of the five elements.
In this light, this monograph, therefore, has sought not
to exaggerate the capabilities inherent in Landpower
or to divide the “military power pie” into better defined, but increasingly irrelevant pieces. Rather, the
monograph provides a better understanding of Landpower that will help policymakers place Landpower
in its appropriate context, recognize its strengths and
acknowledge its weaknesses, while elaborating Landpower’s interdependence with the other elements of
military power. In this manner, the analysis seeks to
facilitate the development of effective policy options
and contribute to better decisions, for when considering the employment of military power, such decisions
never come easy.
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